The study assesses the level of integration among the three Greater China economies (namely China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and examines the suitability of a Greater China currency union. Currently, the three economies have extensive trade and investment linkages. Our analyses show that these economies share common long-run and short-run cyclical variations. We also estimate the output costs of relinquishing policy autonomy to form a currency union. The estimated output losses, which depend on, for example, the method used to generate shock estimates, seem to be moderate and are likely to be less than the efficient gains derived from a currency union arrangement.
Introduction
The economic entity comprising China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan is referred to by different names. The common ones include Greater China, China Circle, and Chinese economic area. 1 Expectedly, the exact geographic coverage of these terms depends on the time and context in which they are referred to and differs across users. In this study, we adopt the term Greater China (DaZhongHua in Chinese) despite the potential resentment caused by the similarity between this term and the "Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere," which was proposed by Japan during World War II.
Greater China is one of the most dynamic regions in the world. Its importance to the global economy has been widely anticipated since the reforms in China began in 1978. 2 Greater China's extraordinary growth rates in GDP and trade, especially China, in the last 20 years has dwarfed those of developed economies. While the upsurge of Greater China is attributable to the economic transition in China, it also reflects the success of the export oriented development policy pursued by these economies. The three economies have strong complementary assets -China has rich and low-cost resources, Taiwan has advanced technological know-how and capital, and Hong Kong offers capital, sophisticated financial services, modern management skills, and a well-developed legal system. Consequently, the integration of these economies offers tremendous synergy that propels Greater China to a high growth trajectory.
Since the 1997 financial crisis, the Asian economies have devoted considerable efforts on policy coordination and economic integration. For example, the Early Warning System was established to ensure financial stability in the area. 3 By the end of 2003, more than ten bilateral currency swap arrangements were concluded under the provisions of the Chiang Mai Initiative. 4 These swap arrangements were designed to pool the (dollar) reserves in the region together to defend against hostile speculative attacks. The economies in the region are also active in negotiating regional and bilateral trade agreements. 5 Besides these trade and policy arrangements, there are other proposals to foster policy coordination and economic integration. These proposals include the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, the use of a basket of currencies as an anchor of exchange rates, the adoption of a dollarization policy, and 1 Harding (1993) provided a succinct account of the origins and various interpretations of the usage of Greater China. Naughton (1997) adopted the term China circle. The term Chinese economic area was used in, for example, Jones, King and Klein (1992) . 2 See, for example, Jones, King and Klein (1992) , Naughton (1997) , World Bank (1997) , and Maddison (1998) . 3 The Early Warning System assesses the region's financial stability by monitoring the balance of payments, the exchange rate regimes, the levels of foreign borrowing, regional and global capital flows, and the activities of the hedge funds in the ASEAN plus 3 countries. The ASEAN plus 3 countries are Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia, plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 4 The Chiang Mai Initiative is a regional financing network introduced by the ASEAN plus 3 countries in May 2002. Technically, the initiative is an expansion of the ASEAN swap arrangement to include the three newcomers. See, for example, Henning (2002) and Bergsten and Park (2002) for discussions on the Chiang Mai Initiative and the construction of a regional financial arrangement in East Asia. 5 For example, the recently concluded free trade agreements in the Asian region include the ASEAN-China Free Trade agreement, the China-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, China-Macau free trade pact, and Japan-Singapore free trade agreement. At the same time, Japan-ASEAN free trade agreement and South Korea-Singapore free trade agreement are under negotiation, and China-Japan-Korea free trade agreement and China-Taiwan free trade agreement have been proposed. the formation of an Asian currency union. The notion of a currency union represents a stringent commitment by its member economies, and it has attracted some interest in the academic circle. For instance, studies including Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) , Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) , Lee, Park and Shin (2002) , McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) , Ng (2002) , and Tsang (2002) found that the Asian economies are not unsuitable for a currency union. However, the differences in the stage of economic development among these economies, the lack of effective institutional arrangements, and the diverse political structures are unfavorable factors for establishing an Asian currency union.
It is hard to deny that there are substantial (economic and political) hurdles involved in forming a currency union among a large group of Asian economies in the near future. However, the prospect of a few economies setting up a currency union is not too remote. The theme of the current study is to assess the suitability of a currency union for Greater China. Undoubtedly, the interaction between the three Greater China economies is very intense. It is conceivable that these economies will further strengthen their economic ties, which can set the stage for a currency union in the future.
The standard literature considers a few criteria for an optimum currency area. 6 Business cycle synchronization is one of the criteria used to evaluate the desirability of a currency union. Other criteria include the similarities of trade patterns and levels of economic development, the degree of trade and financial integration, and the mobility of labor markets. In this exercise, we focus on the business cycle synchronization criterion. When business cycles across economies are synchronous, the cost of using a single currency is reduced because there is less need for asymmetric monetary policy responses to common shocks, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a currency union may not be an optimal monetary arrangement when the economies display asynchronous business cycles.
In the literature, various approaches are adopted to assess the contemporaneous correlation of output shocks, which is commonly used to gauge the degree of business cycle synchronization (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Lee, Park and Shin, 2002; Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro, 2002) . Contemporaneous correlation, however, does not necessarily provide a complete picture. 7 The effects of shocks on economies crucially depend on the transmission mechanism within and across them. Divergent monetary or exchange rate policies may be deemed necessary even in the presence of high shock correlation if the transmission mechanisms are sufficiently different among the economies. On the other hand, a relatively low contemporaneous shock correlation does not exclude the possibility that the economies are in similar phases of the business cycle and, hence, does not require different monetary or exchange rate policies. In view of this consideration, we consider a complementary approach and directly examine comovement patterns of output series.
The current exercise assesses both long-run and short-run output synchronization. First, we investigate whether the outputs from the three Greater China economies move together in the long run, which is considered as a minimum requirement for a currency union discussion. Second, we determine whether 6 Mundell (1961) is the seminal study. Some recent reviews of the literature on optimum currency areas are Lafrance and StAmant (1999) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1999). 7 Another difficulty is that output shock correlation results are not robust to different shock-estimation methods (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Harvey and Jaeger 1993; Canova, 1998) . the three economies share common short-run cyclical business cycles. After all, most monetary policies are devised to smooth out transitory shocks. If these economies share long-run growth trends and short-run economic fluctuations, then a single common currency is a reasonable proposition.
To offer further insight into the prospect of establishing a Greater China currency union, we quantify the individual economies' potential output losses. Since the ideal pre-conditions of a currency union are rarely fulfilled, there is always a cost for an economy to relinquishing policy autonomy and joining a currency union. Thus, in addition to business cycle synchronization, it is instructive to estimate the individual economies' potential costs of joining a currency union. In this exercise, we use the Ghosh and Wolf (1994) model to characterize the economy and evaluate output losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some background information on the trade and investment flows between the Greater China economies. Section 3 presents some preliminary analyses on the real per capita GDP data from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Patterns of output comovement are studied in Section 4. The Johansen cointegration test results and links between the long-run and short-run output interactions are reported. In the same section, we also test for the presence of common business cycles. Section 5 evaluates the output costs of forming a currency union.
The output losses of Greater China and its individual member economies under different shock-identifying schemes and policy objectives are reported. Some concluding remarks are given in section 6.
Integration within Greater China
For most of the contemporary history, Hong Kong has been China's gateway to the global economy.
During the 1960s and 1970s, China acquired a large fraction of its foreign currencies via exporting goods through Hong Kong to the rest of the world. On the other hand, Hong Kong relied on China for its water, food, and other daily necessities. In the last two decades, China and Hong Kong experienced a tremendous increase in economic interactions. For instance, Hong Kong is a main entrepot and intermediates the lion's share of China's external trade via re-exports and offshore trade. Also, a substantial amount of international capital (in the form of foreign direct investment, equity and bond financing and syndicated loans) financing China's economic expansion is raised via Hong Kong. At the same time, intermediating trade and financial flows to China has become a major form of economic activity in Hong Kong and greatly shaped its economic structure.
Perhaps more surprising to a casual observer, economic links between China and Taiwan have proliferated since the 1990s despite ideological differences and occasional political tensions between these two economies. According to official statistics, China was the largest recipient of Taiwan's overseas investment and Taiwan was China's third-largest source of foreign direct investment in 2002. Furthermore, it is widely believed that official statistics under-represent the overall Taiwan economic interest in China.
Some analysts estimated that Taiwan's total investment in China is just behind Hong Kong's but ahead of the US's.
The integration process between the three Greater China economies is proceeding more along de facto than de jure lines. Unlike other economic co-operative entities, the integration process within Greater China was not preceded and governed by explicit bilateral or multi-lateral (trade) agreements but fostered by the gradual liberalization policy in China and the relaxation of restrictions in Taiwan on its (economic) interaction with China. The liberalization policy offered opportunities for private sector actors to realize the benefits from combining strengths in these economies, which in turn further facilitated the liberalization process. To some observers, the growing economic integration among the Greater China economies reflects the triumph of economic forces over political constraints.
One way to assess the extent of integration is to look at trade and investment flows. These are the subjects of the next two subsections.
Trade Relationships
China's external trade with Hong Kong reflects the evolution of Hong Kong's role as China's gateway to the world economy. In 1991, China's exports to Hong Kong reached US$32 billion, which accounted for 44.7% of China exports (Table 1) Strictly speaking, China and Taiwan do not have direct trade. Taiwan's official stance was to prohibit any trade with China until the early 1990s. Since then, Taiwan has allowed indirect trade with China via a third territory (mainly via Hong Kong). In 1999, the rule was further loosened and Taiwan merchandise can transit via the third territory without unloading before shipping to China. Even without direct trade, the trade volume between these two economies has grown two times or ten times, depending on the data sources, in the 1990s. 9,10 According to the Chinese statistics, the trade between China and Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable growth -an average annual growth rate of 22%, since1991. Despite the phenomenal growth, Taiwan's total external trade (exports plus imports) with China was still less than Hong Kong's though Taiwan exported more to China than Hong Kong did in 2002.
In the early 1990s Taiwan imported only a minute amount of goods from China. The low level of imports reflected restrictions imposed by Taiwanese authorities (justified by security reasons) rather than the anaemic demand for Chinese goods in Taiwan 
Foreign Direct Investment
There is a technical issue on classifying investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan in China. Should Hong Kong's investment in China be labeled as foreign investment? Even before July 1997 -when Hong Kong officially came under China's jurisdiction -China's official position was that Hong Kong is an integral part of China. Similarly, China considers Taiwan its sovereign territory and not an independent political entity. If one strictly adheres to this stance, then Hong Kong's and Taiwan's investment is not "foreign" investment in China! In practice, however, Hong Kong's and Taiwan's investment is treated as foreign Hong Kong and Taiwan provide a large proportion of foreign direct investment to China (Table 2 ). The substantial presence of Hong Kong in these investment data is a testament to its role as a main platform for investment in China. The role was enhanced by China's policies in her early phase of the reform program that aimed at attracting investment from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Clearly, Hong Kong's domestic resources were not enough to account for the reported capital flow. In addition to its domestic sources, it is believed that Hong Kong investment in China was funded by a) capital originating in China that was invested back in China via Hong Kong entities in order to enjoy the preferential treatment not available to China's own local capital, b) Taiwan's investment in China that was channeled through Hong Kong in order to circumvent restrictions imposed by the Taiwanese authorities, and c) multinational corporations that used Hong Kong as the bridgehead to enter the Chinese market.
Hong Kong, one of the renowned international finance centers, has a few advantageous features to facilitate capital flow to China. These features include a well-established legal system, a business environment similar to other developed countries, an efficient financial sector, the kinship network, and expertise in the China economy. The ability to perform the role of middleman to channel foreign capital into China has reinforced Hong Kong's status as an international finance center.
Both Chinese and Taiwanese data are perceived to under-report Taiwan's investment interest in China.
The official figures rank Taiwan's investment in China behind Hong Kong, the US, and Japan. Nonetheless, the guesstimate usually puts Taiwan as the second largest source only after Hong Kong. It is believed that a substantial amount of Taiwan's interest in China is invested through, in addition to Hong Kong, the Virgin Islands. The investment flow from the Virgin Islands to China has been quite astonishing in the last ten years. In 1992, China received US$4 million foreign direct investment from the Virgin Islands and in 2002 the investment flow reached US$6.1 billion. 12 Undeniably, the capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan has played an important role in China's recent economic success. The two economies provided the lion's share of foreign capital to China -a total of 66% in 1991 and of 42% in 2002. It is worth noting that neither Hong Kong nor Taiwan is a major supplier in the world capital market. Their investment commitments in China are underpinned by China's policy and the kinship network that spreads across the Greater China region. These investment opportunities allow the three Greater China economies to effectuate their complementary resources, foster their economic growth, and elevate Greater China to the world economic stage.
Preliminary analyses
As revealed in the preceding section, the three Greater China economies display a high level of economic integration. The extensive interaction between these economies provides a good foundation for advancing integration to a higher level. In this section, we present some basic properties of the output data.
12 See the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues.
Quarterly China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan real per capita GDP data are considered. The sample period is 1994:I to 2002:IV. The sample period is mainly dictated by data availability and the liberalization process in China. Although China started its economic reforms in 1978, she had a substantially controlled economy before the early 1990s. Extending the data series backward would not yield useful information relevant to our exercise. The data are retrieved from the CEIC and International Financial Statistics databases and are seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau's X12 method. For brevity, the quarterly real per capita GDP data are referred to as GDP or output data henceforth.
As a preliminary analysis, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test for a unit root in individual output series. The ADF test is based on the regression equation, (1) where is the economy i's GDP at time t, expressed in logs, for i = China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, is the first-difference operator, and t are, respectively, an intercept and time trend, and is the associated error term. Under the unit-root hypothesis, = 0. The lag parameter (p) is chosen to eliminate serial correlation in the estimated residuals.
The ADF test results are reported in Panel A of Table 3 . For all three GDP series, the test statistics do not reject the unit root hypothesis. Panel B contains the results from first-differences of GDP data. In this case, only a constant term was included in the ADF regression equation. The first-differenced GDP data reject the unit root null hypothesis; that is, the first-differenced data are I(0) . As indicated by the Qstatistics, the lag specifications used to conduct these tests adequately capture the intertemporal GDP dynamics. These results strongly suggest that the GDP series are I(1) processes.
Long-Run and Short-Run Output Variations
Since the GDP date are I(1), each series has a stochastic trend. Thus, we employ the Johansen cointegration procedure to test whether the three Greater China economies' GDP series share any common stochastic trend; that is, whether they are cointegrated. In addition to identifying common long-run comovement, the cointegration results help specify the appropriate model to study short-run output interactions and cycles.
Common Stochastic Trend
A currency union has implications for interactions between its member economies that go beyond bilateral relationships. In contrast with the usual bilateral setting embedded in most, if not all, recent studies on currency unions, the cointegration model is a multivariate framework that incorporates interactions between all data series in assessing output movement patterns. Further, the cointegration model provides a coherent structure to study output interactions in both the long run and short run.
Specifically, we can infer whether the national output series move together in the long run, how deviations from the long-run relationship affect short-run output movements, and how outputs interact in the short run. The structure is flexible enough to accommodate various types of data dynamics in the analysis.
The Johansen cointegration test procedure is conducted as follows. Suppose Xt is an nx1 vector containing individual GDP series Xits and has a (p+1)th order autoregressive representation:
( 2) where is the intercept term, and is the innovation vector. To test whether the elements in are cointegrated, the Johansen procedure tests for significant canonical correlations between and 1 , after adjusting for all intervening lags. Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) , for example, give a detailed description of the test.
The cointegration test results are reported in Table 4 . Again, the lag parameter (p) is selected to obtain insignificant serial correlation in the residuals. According to both the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in favor of the presence of one cointegrating vector. Further, there is no evidence that there exists more than one cointegrating vector. These results suggest that the output series are cointegrated. That is, the stochastic trends that drive the individual output series to wander randomly over time are common to the three Greater China economies such that the output series have synchronous long-term movements. The empirical long-run relationship is given by the cointegrating vector.
The cointegration of output data may be viewed as a necessary condition for establishing a currency union. If the output series are not cointegrated, they drift apart in the long run. In this case, it is difficult to effectively manage the three economies using a common monetary policy and a common currency.
Thus, the cointegration result, which implies the national output data are synchronous in the long run, is supportive of the concept of a currency union between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Short-Run Interaction
Since the three GDP series are cointegrated, a vector error correction model (VECM), instead of a vector autoregressive model, is the appropriate framework to study their short-run interactions. The VECM is given by (3) where 1 is the error correction term given by and is the estimated cointegrating vector.
The VECM results are presented in Table 5 . The Q-statistics affirm that the selected VECM models adequately capture the data dynamics and the resulting disturbance terms display no statistically significant serial correlation.
The adjustment of output growth to deviations from the empirical long-run relationship is captured by the coefficient vector. The error correction term is significant in only the Hong Kong and Taiwan, but not the China, equations. That is, Hong Kong and Taiwan respond to deviations from the empirical long-run relationship, which is given by the cointegrating vector. On the other hand, China does not react to the deviation as the error correction term has a small and insignificant coefficient estimate. One interpretation of these coefficient estimates is that China GDP causes both Hong Kong and Taiwan outputs in the long run, but not vice versa (Granger and Lin, 1995) . The result seems reasonable. Since the 1980s, Hong Kong and Taiwan have invested a large amount of capital and relocated a large number of manufacturing facilities to China and, at the same time, China has become a significant export market for these two economies. In addition, the China economy is much larger than the Hong Kong and Taiwan ones. These factors have created complex economic linkages between the three Greater China economies and the reliance of the two small economies to the large one.
The short-run dynamics are described by the coefficient matrices, which relate output growth ( ) to short-term variation in lagged output movements. The three GDP growth equations display different responses to lagged GDP growth. The China economy, which is the largest among the three, depends only on its own lagged growth rates. The Hong Kong economy, on the other hand, responds to growth rates in all the three economies. 
Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Short-Run Cycles
In addition to long-run trends, business cycle synchronization is a key element of designing a currency union arrangement. A common currency and a common monetary policy can be quite ineffective in managing and fine-tuning the economic activity in a currency union if shocks are asymmetric and national business cycles are asynchronous. On the other hand, a common monetary policy can be desirable when business cycles are synchronous across economies because there is less need for asymmetric monetary policy responses. In reality, the commonality of (short-run) cyclical movements is a crucial and practical aspect of policy coordination considerations.
Since the cycle of an output growth series is often represented by its serial correlation, the presence of common serial correlation patterns is taken as evidence of common cyclical variations in business cycles. In this exercise, the common feature test (Engle and Kozicki, 1993; Vahid and Engle, 1993 shocks, there will be no common feature. However, because of economy-specific factors including institutional structures and capital/labor input, the Greater China economies can have dissimilar initial responses to shocks, and shocks propagate through economies at uneven speeds. Despite different initial responses, these economies can react fully and symmetrically to the shock in later periods. This type of "non-synchronized" cycle might be difficult to detect using the common feature test statistic (4), which is designed to detect synchronized cycles. Vahid and Engle (1997) The common feature and codependence test results are reported in Table 6 . In Panel A, the hypothesis of one co-feature vector is not rejected but both the hypotheses of two and three co-feature vectors are rejected. That is, the Greater China GDP series share synchronized cyclical movements and there exists a linear combination of these output growth series that displays no significant serial correlation. Thus, in addition to common long-run trends, the three Greater China economies share common business cycles.
The co-dependence test results in Panel B are based on k and are indicative of the presence of two co-dependence vectors. In addition to synchronized business cycles, these Greater China economies also share non-synchronized business cycles. Since the co-dependence test is a generalized version of the common feature test, the synchronized cyclical component detected by the common feature test will also be detected by the co-dependence test. It is appropriate to interpret that one of the two codependence vectors is the co-feature vector reported in Panel A. Overall, the results indicate that the Greater China economies share common business cycles -some are synchronized, and some are nonsynchronized and display dissimilar patterns in the first quarter of the cycle.
Possible Output Losses
There are both benefits and costs of forming a currency union. It is conceived that benefits come at the microeconomic level and derive from, for example, gains in economic efficiency, reduction in transaction costs (for both business and consumers), elimination of foreign exchange uncertainty, and improved cross-border price transparency. The typical costs are related to macroeconomic management. Joining a currency union implies the monetary authorities have to relinquish policy autonomy and lose the capacity to fine-tune the economy. When shocks to individual economies are not identical, a common monetary policy has limited scope to stabilize and offset effects of shocks on all its member economies.
Thus, the inability of fine-tuning is a potential macro cost. Even though the three Greater China economies are quite well integrated, these economies are not likely to meet all the ideal pre-conditions of a currency union. Thus, it is instructive to investigate the potential cost of joining a currency union. 14
The Model
Intuitively, the cost of giving up monetary policy autonomy is low if the union's common monetary policy is effective in managing shocks to its member economies. The common monetary policy can be ineffective and the costs can be high if shocks to the economies are different and there are significant (nominal) rigidities. While it is not easy to evaluate these costs, we use the Ghosh and Wolf (1994) however, a common monetary policy is used to combat a union-wise shock, which is a function of shocks to its member economies. Since the union-wise shock is not necessarily the same as individual shocks, the adoption of a common policy does not allow every member economy to achieve full employment simultaneously and, hence, induces the output cost of joining a currency union.
Consider the scenario before joining a currency union. Let an economy's output be given by (6) where is a productivity shock, is labor employed in period t, and is the labor share. The real wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. The nominal wage rate, , is downward sticky and is based on information available at t -1,
14 Evaluating the benefits of forming a currency union is an important and involving task that is beyond the scope of the current exercise.
where is the price level, and is the expectations operator based on information available at time t-1. It is assumed that the wage is set (given the expected price and expected productivity shock) to clear the labor market; thus, is the equilibrium employment level. Since the nominal wage is only rigid downward, the wage rate adjusts to clear the market if the unexpected productivity shock is positive. However, if the unexpected productivity shock is negative, the wage rate does not move down and the actual ex post labor demand ( ) is given by (8) Note that does not represent the equilibrium employment level. If the economy is not in a currency union, monetary policies can be used to offset the adverse shock and restore labor market equilibrium by setting the price at the level (9) In this case,
Now suppose the economy forms a currency union with another economy. Let the productivity shock to the currency union be , which is a combination of shocks to the two member countries. Further, assume the currency union's monetary authorities pursue a stabilization policy similar to (9) and set the union's price level ( ) according to (11) When , the policy (11) does not yield full employment for the economy under consideration.
From (6), (8) and (11), the economy's output loss, in percentage term, is given by (12) Equation (12) summarizes the three factors that determine the output loss of joining a currency union:
the shock to the economy , the shock to the currency union , and the labor share . See Ghosh and Wolf (1994) for a detailed discussion of the model, interpretations, and caveats.
The Estimated Losses
Equation (12), which offers a good initial approximation for quantifying the costs of joining a currency union, is used to assess the potential output losses. We calculate the output losses for each of the three Greater China economies and for Greater China as a whole. To accommodate various possible scenarios, the output losses are calculated from the following configurations: a) the labor share ranges from 0.3 to 0.7, b) two ways to characterize the currency union-wide shock -one is the GDP-weighted average of individual economies' output shocks and the other is the simple average of individual economies' output shocks, and c) three approaches to derive output shocks -one based on the VECM, one based on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and one based on the Blanchard-Quah (BQ) (1989) method. Table 7 presents the estimated average percentage output losses. The estimates based on the assumption that the currency union shock is the GDP-weighted average of individual economies' shocks are given in columns 3 to 5 and those based on the assumption that the currency union shock is the simple average of individual economies' shocks are given in columns 6 to 8. A few observations are in order.
First, the estimates illustrate the role of labor share quite clearly. As indicated by equation (12), a larger labor share implies a larger percentage of output loss, which is a consequence of the nominal wage rigidity assumption. Indeed, when the labor share increases, the estimated output loss increases quite significantly. For instance, China's percentage output loss estimate increases more than fivefold where the labor share parameter increases from 0.3 to 0.7. Similar changes in output losses are found in other economies.
Second, the percentage output loss estimate appears quite sensitive to the method used to extract the shock. Under both currency union shock specifications, the HP filter yields the highest output loss estimates and the BQ method delivers the lowest estimates. The results highlight the importance of the shock-estimation method in evaluating the output loss of joining a currency union. The sensitivity of loss estimates to shock extraction method is comparable to the sensitivity of the estimated benefits from free trade derived from different specifications reported in, for example, Brown et al. (2002) and Scollay and Gilbert (2001) .
Third, the rankings of output losses across the two specifications of currency union shocks are quite similar. For instance, Hong Kong has the highest percentage output loss estimates in all the cases under consideration. Its percentage output loss ranges from 0.071% (simple average, = 0.3, BQ) to 1.712% (weighted-average, = 0.7, HP). China, on the other hand, has the smallest estimates when the shocks are extracted using either the VECM or HP filter approaches. The diverse output losses imply that the three Greater China economies can have different views on the prospect of forming a common currency union. China, for instance, has the lowest output cost and is likely to be more susceptible to the notion of a Greater China currency union than the other two economies.
Fourth, there may be a debate on how to define the currency union shock. It is conceivable that China, the largest economy in the group, would prefer the policy abating the average of GDP-weighted shocks while Hong Kong, which is the smallest in the group, would favor the one that focuses on the simple average. In the case of China, the output loss estimates are always smaller when the GDP-weighted average is used. The opposite is true for Hong Kong. The result is quite intuitive because under the GDP-weighted average definition, the stabilization policy is more responsive to shocks that originated in a large economy. The Taiwan case is slightly different -its preference of the GDP-weighted average shock or the simple average shock depends on which shock-extraction method is considered. For Taiwan, the notion of the GDP-weighted average shock is better under both the VECM and HP filter but not under the BQ setting. One possible way for China to persuade the other two economies to adopt the criterion of a GDP-weighted average shock is to redistribute its gain to the other two economies. Such a possibility will be considered when we examine output losses in monetary terms.
Fifth, the output loss of Greater China as an entity should be considered if the economies can compromise and reach a mutually agreeable redistribution scheme. The figures reported under the row heading "Greater China" are quite small. There are only two cases in which the percentage output loss is larger than 0.5%, and two other cases in which the loss is larger than 0.3%. These high-end loss estimates are comparable to some estimates of the benefits of a currency union. For example, in an earlier study (Commission of the European Communities, 1990), it is estimated that the cost savings for the European countries of adopting a single currency are between 0.3% to 0.4% of the aggregate GDP. The benefit of price convergence, which is a plausible consequence of creating a currency union, is 0.55% of the world GDP (Hufbauer et al., 2002) . Further, we should recall that the output loss is derived under the assumption that individual monetary authorities can perfectly fine-tune their economies and, thus, the output loss should be properly interpreted as an upper bound of potential losses. Thus, if a common currency for the three Greater China economies generates a similar magnitude of savings, then the benefits of forming a currency union can outweigh the estimated output losses.
If shocks are accurately estimated by the VECM or the BQ method, Greater China will prefer the policy of managing the GDP-weighted average of shocks to individual economies because such a policy leads to a smaller percentage output loss. However, if the HP filter yields better estimates of shocks, then it is beneficial to pursue the policy of managing the simple average of shocks to individual economies.
Thus, the results reinforce the relevance of the choice of shock-estimation method in evaluating issues related to a currency union.
The loss estimates in Table 7 are derived from a range of labor share values. It is instructive to consider the losses corresponding to some "reasonable" estimates of labor shares in these economies. In her recent study, Harrison (2002) provides labor share estimates for a large number of economies. In this exercise, we adopt her 1993-1996 labor share figures and calculate the corresponding output losses.
Specifically, the labor share parameter is set to 0.36 for China and 0.49 for Hong Kong and Taiwan. 15 The output losses calculated based on the specific set of labor shares are presented in Table 8 . If the selected labor share figures are consistent with the economic structures of the three Greater China economies, then the output cost of forming a currency union is lower than the potential benefit estimated in Commission of the European Communities (1990) . While the potential gain can offset the potential loss in forming a currency union, there is a redistribution issue. As evidenced in the Table, the output loss for Hong Kong can be quite high -more than 0.7% according to the HP filter approach under the GDP-weighted average policy. At the same time, a small economy is likely to achieve a low level of cost savings from gain in economic efficiency and reduction in transaction costs. Thus, without an appropriate redistribution scheme or other economic incentives, a small economy may not elect to join the union because the cost can be higher than the benefit. 16 Obviously, there are other (economic and political)
factors affecting the decision of joining a currency union. Nonetheless, our discussion offers one perspective to evaluate the situation.
The output losses in billions of 1994 US dollars are presented in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 gives the loss estimates from a range of labor share values and Table 10 contains estimates from the selected set of labor share figures for the three Greater China economies. The patterns of output losses are similar to those in Tables 7 and 8 . For instance, the output loss increases with the labor share parameter, the shocks calculated from the HP filter yield the largest loss estimates, and those from the BQ approach yield the smallest estimates.
With the loss expressed in monetary terms, we can assess if, say, China has the incentive to pay the other two economies to adopt the policy of smoothing the GDP-weighted average of individual shocks.
For results in both Tables 9 and 10, the answer depends on which shock-extraction method is used to calculate the output losses. If either the VECM or the BQ method is used, then China's gain from adopting the GDP-weighted average instead of the simple average target is large enough to offset the corresponding losses incurred by Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, if the HP filter is used, then Hong Kong and Taiwan together have an incentive to pay off China to adopt the policy of managing the simple average of individual shocks.
Overall, the loss calculation reveals that possible output losses resulting from forming a Greater China currency union are moderate. Further, the estimated losses are likely to be smaller than the potential gains of forming a currency union estimated by some previous studies. Arguably, these loss estimates and the results presented in the previous sections are supportive of the notion of a Greater China currency union.
Concluding Remarks
The three Greater China economies namely China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have experienced a rapid pace of integration since China launched economic reforms two decades ago. This paper assesses the current level of integration and investigates whether the three Greater China economies are suitable for a currency union. Currently, the three economies have extensive trade and investment linkages. Our analyses show that these economies share common long-run and short-run cyclical variations. The potential output costs of relinquishing policy autonomy seem to be moderate and are likely to be less than the efficient gains derived from a currency union arrangement. 17 Further, some extant studies (Corestti and Pesenti, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Engel and Rose, 2002) show that the implementation of a currency union can induce structural changes that facilitate integration and increase the strength of common business cycles. While our focus is the suitability of a Greater China currency union, our results are complementary to other studies that, using different approaches, infer Asian economies are not unsuitable for a currency union.
Despite the positive evidence, it is fair to consider the hurdles along the path to a currency union.
Eichengreen (2001) and Wyplosz (2002) , for example, point out that the making of a currency union goes beyond the economic preconditions, and the Asian region lacks a) the tradition, b) the institutional setting, and c) the political climate to facilitate integration. These issues are relevant to the discussion of a Greater China currency union. For instance, segments of populations in these economies are quite agonistic about the legacies of war, differences in political structures, and communism. The escalated political squabbles between China and Taiwan and the desire for democracy expressed by Hong Kong people, for instance, are likely to create undulations along the path to a currency union. Another challenge is the costs of adjustment. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are at different stages of economic development. The difference can lead to huge gains from trade and integration and, at the same time,
create serious adjustment problems. For instance, it is believed that China has hollowed out the manufacture sector in Hong Kong and a similar process is happening to the manufacture sector in
Taiwan.
There are both economic and non-economic obstacles to form a Greater China currency union in the near term. However, the prospect is quite encouraging. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan There are differences between China and Taiwan. However, it is hard to perceive these differences will last for too long and significantly hinder economic interactions between China and Taiwan. Given the existing economic ties, any severe political and military conflicts can inflict a huge cost on both economies.
Even though she is agonistic about Taiwan's attempts to engage in any bilateral and multilateral trade agreement as a sovereign country, China is willing to negotiate a trade agreement with Taiwan. 18 As mentioned earlier, the current integration process between the three Greater China economies is proceeding more along de facto than de jure lines. Usually, institutional changes are made to accommodate economic developments in these economies. There is a possibility that the road to a Greater China currency union is led by economic considerations rather than politics.
18 People's Daily Online (2003). Lags are selected to make the serial correlation in residuals insignificant. The Box-Ljung statistics based on the first four and first eight serial correlations of the estimated residuals are given under the heading "Q(4) and Q(8)" and their p-values are given in parentheses underneath. "**" indicates significance at the 5% level (Cheung and Lai, 1995) . (Cheung and Lai, 1993) . The lag parameter is 2. The estimated cointegrating vector is (1, -1.66 -1.31) with the China coefficient normalized to 1. The test statistics for the cointegrating coefficients are 14.88 (China), 20.71 (Hong Kong), and 12.17 (Taiwan); that is, each element of the cointegrating vector is significant. Note: The estimates of the vector error correction model for China (CH), Hong Kong (HK), and Taiwan (TW) are presented. GDPG refers to GDP growth. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates. "**" and "*" indicate significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. ECT is the error correction term. Q(p) is the Q-statistic calculated from the first p sample autocorrelations with the associated p-value given in parentheses underneath. Note: The common feature and codependence test results are reported. "s" gives the number of common feature or codependence vectors. Under the null hypothesis, the common feature test statistic C(p,s) and codependence test statistic C(p,k,s) have an asymptotic (2 distribution with degrees of freedom, where, in this exercise, n = 3, p = 2, k = 1, and r =1. "**" indicates significance at the 5% level. (Harrison, 2002) . See the "Note" to Table 7 for detail. (Harrison, 2002) . See the "Note" to Table 7 for detail.
